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Abstract—Data is of unprecedented importance today. The
most valuable companies of today treat data as a commodity,
which they trade and earn revenues. To facilitate such trading,
data marketplaces have emerged. Present data marketplaces are
inadequate as they fail to satisfy all the desirable properties -
fairness, efficiency, security, privacy and adherence to regulations.
In this article, we propose a blockchain enabled data marketplace
solution that fulfills all required properties. We outline the design,
show how to design such a system and discuss the challenges in
building a complete data marketplace.
MOTIVATION
In this information age, data is the new oil. From the biggest
online giants providing free access to platforms to companies
offering reduced health care premium to employees, data is
the latent currency. Even information about the population of
a country are becoming vital for governance. To an end user,
the trade of her data for services is tacit whereas the companies
regularly track and trade user data. A simple example would
be a recent deal between WhatsApp and Google giving users
option to back up WhatsApp chat data to Google Drive without
impacting their storage quota. To users, this would seem like
a good deal, but the fine print says that the backed up data
is saved unencrypted. So Google would be able to read user
data stored on its servers.
Apart from the widespread data and service trading between
companies and its users, there are specific data marketplaces
which facilitate data trade by matching demand with informa-
tion sources. Information providers or sellers showcase their
data to woo potential buyers. Interested buyers search and
select the information they want and acquire it in exchange
for money. The marketplace (mediator) gets incentive for
facilitating the trade and, in some cases, for hosting the data.
But as data grow in value, so will the cases of cheating and
leaks. A key aspect which the conventional data marketplaces
tend to ignore is ensuring fair trade. The involved parties -
sellers, buyers and mediators, being strategic players, would
often want to collude and cheat in order to gain more money.
Also, if the mediator hosts the complete trade, and buyer
and seller have no communication, then the mediator is in
a position of power. It can equivocate and forge for monetary
gains.
Even if such cases are prevented, there are larger regulatory
and privacy concerns related to data sharing. Different coun-
tries have different privacy laws and hence trade transactions
can be pretty complicated. For example, healthcare related data
needs to comply with HIPAA. Also, to avoid misuse, the trade
history needs to be monitored over time so as to keep tab over
ownership and terms of use.
To tackle the aforementioned problems, we aim to introduce
a blockchain layer to the system, which is a distributed tamper-
proof append-only ledger. This would enable us to keep
historical record of transactions and hence ownership, allow
regulatory bodies to (selectively) monitor trade, ensure fair
trade with smart contracts and disincentivize collusion using
proper incentive mechanism.
Use of blockchain for trading physical goods have been
studied [1]. While tracking physical entities as states on the
blockchain is a tough problem in itself, it is different than
trading data. This is because distribution of data to peers
may leak information to parties which is not desirable. Also,
keeping enormous amounts of data on the blockchain is not
possible because of the severe scalability and usability impact.
Control of valuable information on the chain so that only the
intended recipient gets access is one of the problems we aim
to discuss in this article. We would also like to describe the
market design, required properties and how existing technolo-
gies like blockchain come together to help create an ideal data
marketplace. On top of this, we would also try to identify the
major challenges that remain in this space.
REQUIREMENTS
Digital marketplaces have been studied for a long time, with
[2] or without blockchain [3], [4]. Any marketplace primarily
consists of two classes of players participating in the trade -
the seller S and the buyer B. There can be other middlemen
who facilitate the trade, such as a marketmaker M , but even
with their presence, the trade can be seen as a two step trade
between S and M followed by M and B. In this article, we
concentrate on the data exchange part of a marketplace, i.e.,
S has data x which it wants to sell for price p and B is
interested in buying x. We discuss digital trades of this kind.
We recognize that a marketplace has many more components
like discovery and price negotiation, but we discuss them in
future works. Let us enumerate the desirable properties of any
data marketplace.
The main features of a data marketplace are:
1) Fairness: Before executing a trade, the commodity and
the price needs to be agreed upon. In our case, the commodity
being data, we can define a predicate or condition Φ that needs
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2to be satisfied by the data. So, Φ and price p are decided by S
and B before trade. We call the trade fair, if either B receives
the data satisfying Φ AND S receives p, or neither receives
any of it. Any party should be able to pull out of the trade
unilaterally, which ensures the timeliness property.
An example of Φ would be a hash value check so as to
ascertain the correctness of the data received. Imagine a
file F being traded where both parties agree that for some
cryptographic hash function H , H(F ) = h. Then, Φ is chosen
such that Φ(F ) = 1 iff H(F ) = h. Under the assumption that
H is collision-resistant, it is hard for a malicious party to find
F ′ such that H(F ′) = h, i.e., the malicious party can cheat
the agreement over Φ with negligible probability.
2) Transparency, Privacy and Security: The information
that is being traded must not get leaked to any other party
except B, that too only if the trade was successful, which
would make the system privacy preserving. There should be
public log as to ascertain the ownership of data and assurance
that at least through this system, transferring data or ownership
without keeping log should not be possible. This property
does not capture piracy as anyone can leak data outside the
marketplace which may be beyond the control of the honest
actors of the system. We also want transparency in terms of
pricing where, in a trade between M and B, B should know
what was the original price, terms and conditions of the trade
between M and S.
An example would be Facebook collecting data from users and
selling it to third parties. If such a public log of information
transfer was available, scandals like Facebook-Cambridge An-
alytica could have been identified much faster, if not prevented.
Moreover, any party buying the information could be held
accountable later as she had complete knowledge of the terms
of use of personal data between Facebook and its users. The
security property should ensure only legitimate parties gain
access to the data itself.
3) Regulation: Different types of data have different regula-
tions that may be related to the parties involved in the trade.
For example health data have severe regulations like HIPAA.
Most regulation enforcement can be tricky because of trade
across geographical boundaries and conflicting laws between
countries/regions. Any breach of information is severe so the
marketplace should provide features that inspire trust among
the actors.
4) Efficiency: For any practical system to have widespread
adoption, efficient implementation should be possible. We
would call a data marketplace efficient if proposed protocol
has comparable speed and requirement compared to state-of-
the-art conventional protocols used today.
DESIGN
Conventional Marketplaces
In a conventional digital marketplace, the seller and buyer
interacted either directly with each other or through the mar-
ketmaker. If S and B want to trade directly with each other,
they would need a Trusted Third Party (TTP) to guarantee
complete fairness [5], as two party fair exchange is impossible
without a TTP. Such a trade would thus ensure either Property
1 or 2 but not both as fairness and privacy are at odds
with such a design. This is because, to guarantee fairness,
they would need a TTP who would gain access to the data
breaching privacy. The other option is to follow iterative fair
exchange protocols which would limit damage to fairness but
cannot achieve complete fairness. Another option is to use the
marketmaker M as the TTP. This would have similar problems
because M would gain access to data. Often, the data is kept
with M and hence there is inherent trust on M by both S and
B. The problem with this approach is lack of transparency.
There has been reports of fraud where the marketmaker has
illegally distributed data or tampered metrics to gain unfairly.
Popular examples include a 1.6 billion USD lawsuit against
popular audio streaming company Spotify for license violation
and Facebook misreporting key video metrics.
Marketplaces using Blockchain
Blockchain is a distributed tamper-proof append-only
ledger. First widely used in Bitcoin it has grown in popularity
ever since and has been used to build multiple practical
solutions [6]. Under some honest participation percentage
assumptions, it can be thought of as a trusted party which
can execute arbitrary functionality because of Turing-complete
language supported smart-contracts.
Apart from designing fair protocols using blockchain [7],
[1], [8], there is some existing literature on using blockchain
as a TTP or arbitrator facilitating digital data exchange[9], [2].
Approaches like in ZKCP [10] use Zero-Knowledge which
violate our efficiency property (4) for arbitrary Φ. Other
approaches [11] release parts of data and hence violate the
privacy property (2). Recent work like FairSwap[12] addresses
all the requirements for a two party case.
There has been work done on developing a practical data
marketplace using blockchain. Platforms like IOTA and so-
lutions like DDM [13], Fysical provide us ways and means
to trade information. Other upcoming works like Streamr aim
to provide rich set of features related to data marketplaces.
Lot of literature is available related to data trading [14], [15],
specially IoT and sensor data. While all of them talk about
trading data using blockchain, none of them cover all the
properties discussed above.
Proposed Design
Fair Exchange, even between two parties, is impossible
without a trusted third party. In our proposed design we
want to use blockchain as an enforcer of rules and a trusted
third party. It will contain logs of transactions that would
help ascertain source and ownership of data being traded,
which remains immutable because of the tamper-resistance
property of blockchain. At the same time, it would also
transfer incentives and act as an automated arbitrator in case
of malicious behavior from parties. We use the smart-contract
capabilities in the blockchain platform to implement the above
functionalities. We assume that the blockchain platform is
honest, i.e., the number of malicious actors in the system
is below the bound of the platform, and hence can act as a
trusted third party facilitating exchange. The proposed design
3Fig. 1. The four phases of a transaction
is blockchain platform agnostic as it does not use any feature
of the consensus or the communication layer and hence can
be implemented on most generic blockchain platforms, as
long as it provides Turing-complete programming capabilities.
Verifiability comes in-built with a blockchain platform. A
database system does not provide validation of a sequence of
transactions and hence a blockchain layer is required. We start
with a two party data trade case and then go on to describe a
three party trade using blockchain as the trusted platform.
To explain our proposed design, we will use a weighted
directed graph to model the interactions where each edge
represents the flow of data and vertices represent the different
players in the system. This graph is not stored as a whole by
any of the system participants, but can be constructed entirely
or partially as and when required from the information on the
ledger. Formally, let G = (V,E) be a directed graph, where
|V | = n is the number of players in the system and for each
e ∈ E, e = (u, v), u be the seller and v be the buyer for that
transaction e. We omit the money flow from v to u and we
assign weights to edges as the price of data. So, w(e) = p
where p is the price of data being sent from u to v.
For each ei = (u, v) ∈ E, we define Φi to be the condition
(or predicate) that u and v agreed upon, according to property
1. w(ei) = pi be the price of the data D that is being sold by
u and bought by v. The players, additionally, have access to
a global ledger functionality L, which is the blockchain layer
consisting of a smart contract. The internal state of L is public
and it consists of account balances of the parties and contracts.
It also provides interfaces to update balances, transfer funds
and freeze/unfreeze balances. Freeze transfers funds from a
party balance to a contract and unfreeze does the opposite. L
also hosts the smart contract functions which can be triggered
using the interface it provides. The function variables are also
saved as part of L internal state.
We outline the process of creation of the graph in Figure
1. Initially, let G = (V,E) where V = E = φ. Let f() be
an invertible function. For each interested seller u and buyer
v, the transaction between u and v follows the four phases as
given in Figure 1.
We need to note that in Phase 3(b), buyer receives f(D)
and not D. Hence it should verify another statement Φ′i such
that Φ′i(f(D)) = 1 =⇒ Φi(D) = 1.
If the above protocol terminates successfully, we modify G
as V ′ = V ∪{u, v} and E′ = E∪{(u, v)}. w((u, v)) = pi. In
case of disputes of over transaction, L arbitrates and decides
whether Φi(D) = 1.
As an example, we can think of Alice selling Bob a file D
divided into chunks [1, . . . c], for a price of $5. f() can be a
random permutation over 1 to c and Φ(D) = 1 iff all chunks
contain a particular bitstring s. Ofcourse, to the buyer, f(D)
is useless but she can verify Φi(D) = 1 after getting f(D).
Later she is revealed f−1 which she applies over f(D) to get
the desired information. Here, u is Alice, v is Bob, edge is of
form (u, v) and w((u, v)) = 5.
To argue that our design can guarantee properties 1-4, we
need to give some additional description.
• Fairness: For a single buyer-seller trade, under the assump-
tion that either the seller or the buyer is honest, the design
can assure strong fairness guarantees. We can use a protocol
like FairSwap [12] to guarantee fairness. The overall idea of
FairSwap is that both B and S agree over Φ which is expressed
4as a boolean circuit. The scheme is designed in such a way
that while decrypting if B is unable to decipher information as
per agreement, it can generate a Proof of Misbehavior(PoM)
and submit to L which can then punish S for wrongdoing.
• Transparency, Security and Privacy: Every transaction
is mediated through L and hence recorded in the ledger.
Any party can ascertain data ownership by looking into the
blockchain. For security, we use some encryption function in
place of f and some cryptographic hash function in Φ. f−1
is the key used to encrypt D. For ensuring privacy, we need
to ensure that L does not have access to D but can still verify
if Φ(D) = 1. This can be done using Zero-Knowledge Proofs
or PoM [12].
• Regulation: Checking whether a data trade follows guide-
lines can be tricky. Here we assume that regulations can be
codified and for each trade (edge ei), let ρi be the predicate
that decides whether the data exchanged D follows the regula-
tions or not. In addition to Φi, both buyer and seller inherently
agrees to ρi when they enter trade. Unlike Φi, ρi is stored in
L as tamper-resistant log. If some D does not follow ρi, then
it is on the buyer to report the error and cancel the trade, as
done for Φi. If not, the violations can be found out by law
enforcement authorities and penalized on retrospect.
• Efficiency: The major hurdle for efficiency is the complexity
of defining and verifying Φi and ρi. We could use SNARKs,
Merkle trees over boolean circuits or state-of-the-art algo-
rithms for analysis over encrypted data. For simple predicates,
all of the above techniques are suitable, but there is still work
to be done for complex predicates.
Example
Let us consider an example of such a marketplace. A new
online medicine portal wants to give targeted ads and regulate
area-wise stock and hence needs medicine consumption and
health record data. The data sellers might be small medicine
shops in every locality. In practice, however, there will be data
aggregators who collect data from local shops and then sends
the collated information to the buyer.
Now let us think of the practical implication of such a trade.
The aggregators would have to comply with all health data
regulations which can be rather costly for them, whereas their
only requirement is to accumulate the information and match
the buyer with the sellers. A easier strategy for them would
be to just mediate the trade, without keeping the plaintext
data. In this case, the sellers transfer encrypted data to the
aggregators and send the encryption key directly to the buyer.
The aggregator accumulates the data and ensures required
predicates are satisfied by all the information collected. The
buyer buys the data from the aggregators and sends the money
to the blockchain layer which transfers due incentives to all
the honest parties. Note that our construction can be extended
to capture such interactions and we will describe the details
in the next section.
TRADING DATA WITH INTERMEDIARIES
The last extended example shows that although our design
captures most data trades, not necessarily all trade follow
our specifications. In particular, we want to have mediators
(like the aggregators above) in between sellers and buyers.
The previous model assumed any data flow to be a chain of
two party trades, but now we want to weaken the assumption
and introduce mediators who do not buy or own data, but
just facilitate trade with access to only the encrypted data. A
typical marketplace hosting website can act as this mediator in
a practical scenario. The mediator need not invest in buying
the data, but just on the marketplace hosting infrastructure.
Like current mediators, say Netflix and Amazon, the mediators
may perform value-addition by providing exceptional connec-
tivity and advertisement among other services. The blockchain
smart-contracts ensure that incentive transfer happens automat-
ically from the buyer to the seller and the mediator, as long
as the terms of the trade are adhered to. We aim to extend
our previous model to capture the intermediaries and show it
is still secure.
With the changed setup, let us state the roles of players in
the trade.
• Seller (S): S transfers obfuscated information f(D) to a
trade mediator and reveals the original information to the buyer
in exchange for monetary incentive. She forges information
related agreement only with the buyer. The agreement with
mediator is to transfer percentage of incentive on successful
matchmaking by the mediator.
• Mediator (M ): She collects obfuscated data from S (Poten-
tially collects from multiple sellers and sells the collection to
a buyer. But here we consider the simplest case of one seller).
She wants to avoid data leak and just wants to earn incentive
for successfully facilitating an information transfer.
• Buyer (B): B is interested in data D owned by S and wants
to acquire the data for some price p, given that it satisfies Φ.
It gets to know about D and S through M and hence willing
to give commission to M .
The players interact as follows:
1) S provides M with f(D), ρ and agree on price pS and
commission cS%. Agreement is sent to L.
2) B provides M with Φ and agrees on price pB and com-
mission cB%. Agreement is sent to L.
3) M ensures Φ(D) = 1 and sends f(D), ρ to B for price
p = min(pS , pB). ρ, p and other parameters of the deal is
sent to L.
4) B checks if it agrees to ρ and proceeds with paying p +
cB × p to L.
5) S sends f−1 to B.
6) B sends a complaint with evidence (like PoM) to L within
time t.
7) L checks complaint and penalizes guilty party as per norms
of the system. Otherwise, it sends (cS + cB)×p to M and
p− (cS)× p to S.
A pictorial representation of the above is given in Figure 2.
To capture such mediated trade relationships in our directed
graph, we extend G to be G = (V,E, T ) where T is a set
of three tuples (s,m, b) which represent Buyer, Mediator and
Seller respectively. Hence, s,m, b ∈ V . For each tuple, the
interaction is as described above.
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Collusion
For our original framework, each trade was between two
players. As discussed, there exists literature on two party
fair trade. But in our extended framework, each trade has
three parties. We need to argue that for such interactions, the
protocol is resistant to adversarial players and their collusion.
We assume here that all players are rational and will act
maliciously only for some monetary benefit.
• Malicious Seller: A malicious seller S∗ would cheat by
sending D∗ 6= f(D) or some ρ∗ 6= ρ. Providing ρ∗ makes
her vulnerable to retrospective legal actions as a copy of ρ is
kept on the chain. For D∗, it would have to lie again in step
5 and hence in step 6 an honest B would raise a complaint
and eventually be penalized.
• Malicious Mediator: A malicious mediator M∗ may fail
to confirm Φ(D) = 1 or tamper f(D). For the former, B
immediately checks and the deal breaks, hence there is no
incentive for M∗ to try that. For the latter, B raises complaint
in step 6 and S proves innocence using access to D and
agreement in step 1 stored on the blockchain.
• Malicious Buyer: A malicious buyer B∗ may attempt to
underpay or raise false complaints. If it directly underpays,
it will not receive f−1 in step 5, as S checks step 4 before
acting in step 5. For false complaints, it should not be able
to forge witness. Existing protocols like ZKCP and Proofs of
Misbehavior already ensure such properties and hence, with
high probability, B∗ will be penalized.
• Colluding Seller and Mediator: As both the cases of
malicious seller and malicious mediator hinges on an honest
buyer, hence this collusion brings no new attack vector. The
argument for the two cases collectively works for this situation.
• Colluding Seller and Buyer: S∗ and B∗ may collude to
deny M of his commission. The only way to do so is by
trading off-chain as the incentive transfer is handled by the
smart contract. While using the system, the collusion cannot
deny an honest mediator of her commission, under normal
honest majority assumptions of the blockchain platform. Our
system is not meant to tackle out of system transactions like
piracy and hence we do not address the case where the buyer
and seller collude to transact outside the system.
• Colluding Mediator and Buyer: M∗ and B∗ might to-
gether try to gain access to D without paying S. But to do
that, B∗ either needs step 5 to be executed before step 4 or lie
on step 6. S, being honest, will not execute step 5 if step 4 is
not complete. False complaint, as argued above, is caught with
high probability. Hence, collusion between malicious M∗ and
B∗ does not incentivize any of the parties.
Example with Intermediaries
In the previous example, we highlighted the need for an
extension to the framework to handle practical challenges that
arise during data trade. Let us now look at the actions taken
by different parties involved in such a minimal trade. For
simplicity, we here assume a single seller, buyer and mediator.
The local medicine shop (seller) owns data D which con-
tains fields like (id, Age, Blood Group, Class of Disease,
Drug Name, . . . ) where Class of Disease ∈ {Diabetes,
Heart Ailments, Psychological Issues}. It wants to sell
it at a price pS such that no personally identifiable infor-
mation is transferred. The buyer B wants medical records
related to diabetes, heart and psychological drugs sold in the
locality. Hence, it describes Φ(D) = 1 iff D has a field
named Class of Disease where all entries belong to the set
{Diabetes, Heart Ailments, Psychological Issues} and
dataset D has at least 10000 rows.
The seller generates a key and encrypts the data using that
key, except columns id and Class of Disease. The encrypted
data along with signed information on price, commission and
other regulation on the data is sent over to the mediator.
The buyer sends a signed tuple of requirements and cost
with commission that it is willing to pay to the mediator.
It receives encrypted data from mediator and checks if re-
quirements match. This check may be done easily in this toy
example as parts of data are kept unencrypted, but in reality a
6primitive like homomorphic encryption or ZKP could be used,
as discussed earlier. The buyer also receives the regulations
that the data needs to maintain and other pricing information,
whose signature it verifies. After matching the details received
with that on the ledger, it sends the money to to the ledger
after which it receives the key. The key is used to decrypt the
data. A complaint is raised if there exists any anomaly in the
trade. Again, primitives like, but not limited to, PoM may be
used.
The mediator registers itself before receiving the encrypted
data from seller. It also receives the regulation and pricing
details, which if it agrees to, it countersigns and sends to the
ledger. It receives the requirements from the buyer along with
other budget constraints. It checks whether any data matches
the budget and information requirements and if so, sends
that to the buyer. Again, as earlier, checking property on the
encrypted data is easy for this example, but in practice, any
of the above discussed primitives may be used.
The above example pseudocodes can be made arbitrarily
complex to cover multiple scenarios like having Φ = (ΦM ,
ΦS) where ΦM is only checked by Mediator over encrypted
data. ΦS can contain predicates that the unencrypted data
should satisfy and S should terminate trade if D does not
satisfy ΦS . Similarly, the ledger functions can be extended
to punish either M or S or both, depending on PoM. Other
extensions to the example are multiple sellers using the same
mediator, multiple parallel trades processed by same ledger
using transaction and player ids. We could have used ZK
Proofs instead of PoM.
CHALLENGES AND SCOPE OF WORK
Let us look at some of the challenges with our proposed
design and some areas where there are huge possibilities of
improvement.
1) Global Fairness: Although we ensured two party fairness
using blockchain, we still need to provide fairness guarantees
at a much larger context. Looking at a particular information
flow, from source to sink, at each vertex it becomes part of a
larger dataset. An individual data generator (source) is likely to
claim not absolute payment from the next vertex in the flow,
but a percentage of incentive from the final data consumer
(sink). The percentage can be static, that is fixed during initial
sale, or dynamic as the information flows from source to sink
through other vertices. Capturing these complicated contracts
and tracking the flow for fair payout is a challenge. Each
seller will have its own restrictions on how the buyer can use
this data. This data changes hands and hence it should also
accumulate the usage restrictions provided by its owners along
the way. Keeping track of these regulations and its enforcement
during trade is a major challenge. If these regulations are kept
on blockchain and defined as logical proposition, they can be
accumulated as intersection of these propositions. The problem
with this kind of approach is that it may make the regulation
too strong and hence render the data unusable. Sufficient work
needs to be done in this regard.
2) Efficiency: Predicate checking over encrypted data for
arbitrary logic is still inefficient. Similarly, Zero-Knowledge
Proofs which are non-interactive, succinct and captures any
complicated generic logic are hard to develop. For example,
zk-SNARKs need a trusted setup which can be difficult in
a blockchain scenario. On the other hand, STARKs do not
need trusted setup and is post-quantum resistant, but the proof
size is much larger than SNARK. Bulletproofs have a large
proof verification time. In case of Proofs of Misbehavior,
they are still inefficient for large circuits. For a circuit with
m gates, it takes O(m) communication and computation.
Practical homomorphic encryption schemes are only efficient
for basic mathematical operations. Fully homomorphic encryp-
tion schemes are still orders of magnitude slower than their
plaintext counterparts. There is a huge scope for development
of algorithms in this space.
3) Incentivization: In this article, we had only provided a
basic incentive structure. A much more robust payout strategy
needs to be developed for a marketplace use case, which
needs thorough game theoretic evaluation and simulation to
find the optimal incentive for each players to make foul play
economically taxing. All optimal payout strategies may not
be useful for a marketplace scenario as the platform needs
sufficient margin and liquidity to function properly and these
practical factors should also be kept in mind while designing.
Capturing practical constraints in a game theoretic framework
is a challenge in itself. Disincentivizing foul play by dishonest
actors and designing a protocol resilient to colluding malicious
parties is a challenge and we wish to pursue this as part of
future work.
4) Codifying Law: Laws and regulations are written in natural
languages. They are made subjective in order to capture a
large number of potential cases. They can sometimes be hard
to fully capture in a programming language. The deliberate
ambiguity in natural languages is at odds with the logical
preciseness of programming languages. Even if small nuances
are missed, they can lead to huge losses and data breaches.
Also, because of the immutable nature of contracts, it is hard
to update buggy or outdated contracts once deployed. It is
important to capture laws into programmable logic and verified
using formal verification methods. A major challenge to formal
verification in this space is to draft the specifications precisely.
Security audit of contracts and using well known audited open
source codes like ERC-20 should be encouraged as much as
possible.
5) Data Duplication: Assuring that the buyer is not buying
the same data twice is a problem. Today, most digital data
bought from online marketplaces are chosen and bought on
the basis of the description given by the owner of the data
or the platform. Our proposed design suffers from the same
problem. If we use the predicate Φ to capture such a property
by mentioning the data itself which we do not want to buy
again, it risks confidentiality of data. Revealing parts of data
itself to the buyer to prevent duplicate buys prevents us from
delivering fairness. Ensuring data description matches data is
a challenge in itself. Moreover, specifying Φ in a manner that
captures requirements property without violating any of the
marketplace deliverable properties is a tough task. We need to
explore tools like Convergent Encryption which can provide
us a way to avoid duplication without revealing anything about
7the data.
6) Beyond Data Trade: A pragmatic data marketplace should
have features much more than just data trade, like search, ana-
lytics and computation over data. We discussed only the secure
data exchange part, but without search discovery and matching
services on the marketplace, it is incomplete. For the pricing,
we might use auction on blockchain among the interested
parties. As we talk of a privacy preserving and secure portal,
we need to include techniques from searchable encryption,
encrypted analytics and computation over encrypted data. We
should provide verifiable results or guarantees so that no party
can cheat another and hence provide a fair platform. Each of
these problems are worth pursuing in their own right. Inclusion
of these added features to the framework would bring added
constraints, but we need to show that the basic marketplace
properties are still guaranteed.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have enumerated the properties desired of
any practical data marketplace, outlined ways and means to
design such a marketplace which facilitates trade. Primarily
being an idea paper, the exact instantiation of methods and
possible tools to be used are not concretely specified. The
system design in its entirety is under construction. Implemen-
tation of a prototype is ongoing work through which we aim to
further understand implementation issues like scalability and
performance. The long term goal is to design and implement
a production grade marketplace enabling data trade.
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